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RE-EXAMINING THE FUNCTIONS OF TRADEMARK LAW1
Mohammad Amin Naser*
Introduction
Some commentators and scholars argue that the main function of trademarks is to signify
quality.2 This view sees trademarks as being identifiers of quality providing consumers with
information about the quality of their products, and based on the consumer's previous
satisfaction when making purchases. Moreover, these commentators argue that basing
protection on the quality function promotes the protection for trademarks owners. As a result,
manufacturers have the required incentive to produce products of high, indeed superior
quality.3 This argument contends that owners of well-known trademarks should enjoy
protection even when use of such trademarks by a third party is for dissimilar goods and/or
services.
I shall argue, however, that this argument is not based on solid ground. Quality is
subjective, rather than objective, and differs according to individual consumers. In addition,
such an argument is artificial when applied to legal scenarios because the issue of quality is
subject to economic considerations, and is both distinct from, and irrelevant to the theory of
property.
In part I, I shall start by discussing the roots of the origin function of trademarks, and the
possibility of this function to embody other functions of trademarks. In part II, I shall
examine in closer detail the argument concerning original quality, as envisioned by its
founder, the American academic Frank Schechter, while part III tackles the current expansion
in Schechter's argument. Part IV questions the validity of Schechter's argument, and part V
provides a special offer as a solution to the dilemma of substituting the origin function for the
quality function as the basis for trademark protection. The proposed offer focuses on the
source and origin function as the only primary function of trademarks, while keeping the
door open for other secondary functions.
I. Roots and Development of the Source/Origin Argument and its Connection with
Other Trademarks Functions
Understanding the concept of the source/origin argument is important in order to be able
to comprehend its ability to fulfil the needs of different parties within the context of
trademarks. Thus, it is essential to find its roots and to assess if its evolution could help to
justify current emerging cases in trademarks, such as the issue of well-known trademarks. In
this regard, I shall argue that the notion of the source/origin argument has developed, and
may be modified, now and in the future, in accordance with the advent of trademarks.
However, I shall start by providing a brief historical overview of the source and origin
1 Based on a paper submitted during the Graduate Conference titled: "Trademark Functions: Origin or
Quality?", and awarded the prize for best presentation. University of Leicester. March 2007.
* Mohd Naser is a Ph.D. candidate and tutor of contract law, University of Leicester, UK. I would like to thank
Andreas Rahmatian for his valuable comments on earlier drafts. I am also indebted to Lior Zemer and Camilla
Baasch Andersen.
2 Georgios I. Zekos, Trademarks and Cyberspace, 9(5) THE J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 496, 500 (2006).
3 PETER S. MENELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENERAL THEORIES (BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT AND GERRIT
DE GEEST eds., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham. UK. 2000) Vol. 2, 149.
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function, which is necessary when asserting that this function has a rational basis. Further, the
historical roots and development of this notion indicate that it can evolve and transform in a
manner which allows the existence of secondary functions for trademarks.
A. Historical Evolution of the Origin Function
The use of trademarks finds its roots in historical practices, perhaps it "is one of the oldest
of established human practices."4 In its early stages, the use of trademarks involved the
branding of cattle and animals,5 with the intention being to distinguish the ownership of one
individual's cattle from the cattle of the others by branding the cattle with certain colours or
signs or by cutting the cattle ears in certain shapes. "This practice is portrayed in early Stone
Age cave drawings and in wall paintings" 6 and scholars called such marks proprietary or
possessory marks.7
Afterwards, in mediaeval times, the use of marks to identify the source and origin took a
different form, because of the advent of trade and the introduction of guild marks. 8 Statutory
regulations required each guild group to affix a certain mark to all examples of a certain
product.9 The aim of this practice was to identify the source and origin of the goods "in order
to permit detection and punishment of the individual responsible for a defect," 10 "or in order
that in case of shipwreck or piracy the goods might be identified and reclaimed by the
owner."
11
The industrial revolution led to the emergence of the modern use of trademarks as a
source and origin identifier, because of "[t]he loss of the personal connection between
producer and consumer".1 2 The "natural result was the concentration of production capacity
in larger units, and this in turn required the development of methods of distribution to get the
goods to the consumer." 13 Thus emerged the use of trademarks to let consumers know the
manufacturer and/or provider of the goods, i.e. "to represent to the consumer only the
4 Patricia K. Fletcher, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value of a Trademark System, 36 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 297, 301 (1981-1982); see also Daniel D. Domenico, Mark Madness: How Brent Musburger
and the Miracle Bra May Have Led to a More Equitable and Efficient Understanding of the Reverse Confusion
Doctrine in Trademark Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 597, 600 (2000).
5 Sidney A. Diamond. The Historical Development of Trademarks. 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 223 (1983); see
also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:1 131-132 (2 nd ed.,
The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing, 1984).
6 Amir H. Khoury, Ancient and Islamic Sources of Intellectual Property Protection in the Middle East: A Focus
on Trademarks, 43(2) IDEA 151, 156 (2003); see also Diamond, supra note 5, at 224 (arguing that wall
paintings and pottery jars used in Egypt, China, Greece and Rome showed the early uses of trademarks.)
7 LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 693 (2 nd ed., Oxford University Press,
2004).
8 Diamond, supra note 5, at 230.
9 Abraham S. Greenberg, The Ancient Lineage of Trade-Marks, 33 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 876, 882 (1951).
10 Fletcher, supra note 4, at 301; see also Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 60
TRADEMARK REP. 334, 335 (Reprint in 1970 of the 1927 text) (Schechter provides that guild marks were
.compulsorily affixed to goods by statute, administrative order or municipal or gild regulation, so that defective
work might be traced to the guilty craftsman and heavily punished, ... [t]his mark was a true mark of origin".)
1 Schechter, supra note 10, at 335; see also Spyros M. Maniatis, The Communicative Aspects of Trade Marks:
A Legal, Functional and Economic Analysis (1998) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London) (on file with the
British Library).
12 Michael Blakeney, Trade Marks andthe Promotion of Trade, 5(6) INT'L TRADE L. & REG. 140, 140 (1999).
13 Diamond, supra note 5, at 237.
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physical source or origin of the product or service in connection with which the mark was
used.", 4
Furthermore, in modern times, with the growth of international trade and the distribution
of goods and services throughout the whole world, the source and origin function of
trademarks has retained its capacity to develop, and trademarks function in a manner by
which goods and/or services of one undertaking may be distinguished from those of others.
The significance of this development is that the identity of the manufacturer itself is of no
importance; trademarks do not tell consumers where the goods and/or services come from.
Rather, consumers are now interested in knowing that certain goods and/or services emerge
from a certain source and origin which could be anonymous, and this makes them differ
between those goods and/or services from the goods and/or services of others of the same
class. 15 As one scholar argues: "[t]rademarks could be understood as indications, not
necessarily of physical origin, but of a more general connection between the trademark owner
and the trademarked goods." 
16
B. Secondary Functions of Trademarks
As such, the source and origin function of trademarks is the main, and indeed, primary
function of trademarks, and any trademark should be able to function in this manner.
Otherwise, it could not qualify as a trademark. However, this does not mean that other
functions of trademarks do not exist; trademarks could have -and in most cases have-
secondary functions such as indicating quality, advertising and providing information. The
quality function, as a secondary function, differs from the source and origin function in that
the latter is a requirement in all trademarks, whereas the existence of the former is not
necessary. Where it does exist, "it retains a neutral character",' 7 because it informs the
consumer that he/she has found a particular article with a high quality, but it could equally
remind another consumer of poor quality.
Trademarks perform a further, secondary function besides that of quality, namely an
advertising and marketing function.' In today's markets, where a huge number of goods are
available, producers can use their trademarks to advertise goods and/or services 19 and to
allow purchasers to identify the source and origin thereof. "The way in which trade marks
facilitate this process is [through] their ability to distinguish and identify goods and
services." 20 Indeed, "[t]he mark actually sells the goods,"21 meaning that trademarks facilitate
14 MCCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 3:3 110. The term -physical source or origin" means concrete origin, i.e. "that
the trade mark refers to the actual producer or trader of the product ... or to a number of affiliated producers.";
see Maniatis, supra note 11. at 123.
15 Sidney A. Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 528, 537 (1980)
(arguing that "[t]rademarks are the symbols that bridge the gap that now has grown so wide between the
producer and the consumer.")
16 Robert C. Denicola, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation and the Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995. 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77 (1996).
17 WILLIAM CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS
AND ALLIED RIGHTS 621 (6th ed.. Sweet & Maxwell. 2007).
18 Fletcher, supra note 4. at 308-323.
19 Justin A. Horwitz, Conflicting Marks: Embracing the Consequences of the European Community and its
Unitary Trademark Regime, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 245, 248-249 (2001) (arguing that "a trademark
operates like an advertisement by convincing a consumer to purchase the trademarked product.")
20 Blakeney, supra note 12, at 141.
21 Schechter, supra note 10, at 338 (emphasis added); see also Maniatis, supra note 11, at 155 (arguing that the
aim of advertising is "to sell goods by influencing buyers.")
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consumers' identification of the source and origin of the goods and/or services. This in turn
benefits the owner in selling his/her goods and/or services, because the advertising function
assists in preventing of the diversion of his/her sales to other undertakings.
The advertising function relates to one of the most important theories justifying
trademarks: the Social-Planning theory. According to this theory, trademark systems should
be formulated in order to achieve a just and attractive culture,22 a culture which seeks to do
justice to the trademark owner and to other traders and competitors stressing the cultural and
expressive rights of the public in trademarks. This theory also acknowledges that the creation
of trademarks goes through two stages; first, the trademark owner associates the mark with
23the article, and second, the public grants the required recognition to this association.
One of the ways of achieving this recognition and association by the public is through
extensive advertising. This educates consumers and creates a demand for goods and/or
services, 24 in order to create brand awareness in the minds of consumers, "especially in
markets characterised by over-capacity and increased competition". 25 This makes the public's
recognition more significant.
The last secondary function of trademarks is the informative function. 26 This function
means that trademarks play an important role in providing consumers with the necessary27
amount of information that needs to be communicated. Providing them with information
about products is also related to personal experiences with certain products, which differ from
one consumer to the other.
One can infer utilitarian grounds from this function; utilitarianism is related to the
philosophical concept by which utilitarian theorists justify trademarks insofar as they reduce
consumers' search costs. 28 One of the main grounds for the utilitarian and economic
justification of trademarks is the idea that trademarks reduce consumers' search costs. 29 This
shows the importance of philosophical backgrounds in the formulation of trademark systems.
This informative function provides consumers with information regarding the sponsorship of
goods and/or services, and it is vital to know the source and origin of the products. This
results in a lowering of the search costs for consumers. This is especially the case when the
producer enters into a licence agreement with another party in order to authorize him/her to
manufacture the products under the licensors' trademark, which includes a relationship of
sponsorship and affiliation that indicates a connection between the licensor (the trademark
22 William W. Fisher, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1214 (1997-1998);
see also WILLIAM FISHER, THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (STEPHEN R. MUNZER ed., NEW ESSAYS
IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY, Cambridge University Press, 2001).
23 Steven Wilf. Who Authors Trademarks, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT L. J. 1. 8 (1999).
24 Maniatis, supra note 11, at 122-12325 Id. at 154.
26 This function is also called the communicative function, because of its ability to convey information to
consumers.27 Blakeney, supra note 12, at 141.
28 Andrew Griffiths, The Impact of the Global Appreciation Approach on the Boundaries of Trade Mark, 4
INTELL. PROP. Q. 326, 327 (2001) (Griffiths argues that trademarks "provide an economic benefit to consumers
by providing them with useful information, which reduces the cost of searching for products with particular
qualities."); see also Maniatis. supra note 11. at 120-121 (Maniatis argues that "humans learned through social
interaction to utilise together with verbal symbols. other signs as mechanisms for communication" in order to
preserve 'the spent effort with the number of purchases we make in a lifetime".)
29 Domenico, supra note 4, at 601 (arguing that "[t]rademarks reduce the amount of time and money a consumer
must spend to obtain a product by allowing for easier differentiation among products and producers.")
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owner) and the licensee. For example, it is obvious that all the COCA-COLA sold in the
world does not originate from Atlanta in the U.S.30 Rather, the Coca-Cola Company enters
into licence agreements with others to produce under its trademark. In this way, the
informative function provides consumers with information that the production of Coca-Cola
in a certain country lies within the sponsorship and affiliation of a certain origin and source.
In order to assess the importance of this argument, it would be clearer if one were to
imagine a world without trademarks. In such a world, consumers would not be able to
differentiate between sources and/or origins of goods and/or services, and this would
effectively deprive them from choosing the items of their preference. Thus, "[t]he value of
being able to choose between alternatives ... diminishes.' Hence, consumers would not be
able to choose rationally because they do not know the relevant information 32: source/origin
of the goods. As a result, consumers would not be able to distinguish the source and origin of
goods and/or services available in the market, and the loss of this primary function would
further prevent other secondary functions because of their reliance and dependence on the
source and origin function. This shows the importance of this primary function, and how it
affects other secondary functions.
Trademarks function in a number of manners. The primary function is the source and
origin function, which all trademarks should perform, whereas the quality, advertising and
the informative functions are secondary functions and are attached to the source and origin
function.33 Since its first use in history and until recent times, the primary function has
developed and has proved to be a flexible notion that transforms to fulfil the needs of modem
trade. The source and origin function is indeed the only rational basis for trademark
protection. Through this function, one is to identify that products originate from a certain
source and origin, albeit anonymous, and distinguish those products from other products by
others especially when products are homogenous, as well as being able to embrace other
secondary functions. This establishes a rational basis for protection because it regards the
consumer confusion criterion as the main issue since consumers are protected from confusion
about the source and origin of the products. Consequently, this in turn benefits trademark
owners as well.
II. Schechter's Argument of Quality
The expansion in the protection of trademarks finds its roots in an article by Frank
Schechter,34 The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, a text written in 1927.35 Schechter
is known as the founder of dilution,36 even though he mentions this particular word only once
30 Blakeney, supra note 12, at 141.
31 Maniatis, supra note 11, at 109.
32 CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 17, at 621.
33 Dan Shanahan, The Trademark Right: Consumer Protection or Monopoly?, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 233, 238-
241(1982) (arguing that the origin function is the primary function of trademarks because it plays an important
role in consumer protection. whereas the other functions are secondary functions, which not every trademark
should have.)
34 Frank I. Schechter is an American famous academic, he was the first to consider the quality function of
trademarks as the only rational basis for trademark protection.
35 Schechter's article was first published in 1927, it was cited as: Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV. 813-833 (1926-1927).
36 Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Famous Trademarks: Ordinary Inquiry by the Courts of Marks Entitled to an
Extraordinary Remedy, 64(1) BROOK. L. REV. 423, 428 (1998); see also Hazel Carty, Do Marks with a
Reputation Merit Special Protection, 19(2) EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 684, 684 (1997) (arguing that it is
Schechter, the American academic, is the founder of the dilution notion, "challeng[ing] the traditional
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in his argument,3 in the course of referring to the German court's decision in the Odol case.3
His ideas about the quality function of trademarks formed the basis for a utilitarian, economic
justification for trademarks, and utilitarian theorists thoroughly deployed his ideas to justify a
wide scope of protection to trademarks owners.39 "Behind this model lies a utilitarian
rationale., 40 The reason that Schechter's argument is relevant and vital in the trademark
context is that it is responsible for a change in current trademarks legislation, and his ideas
led to the wide range of monopolistic rights currently enjoyed by the trademark owners.
Schechter refuted the argument of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hanover Star Milling. v.
Metcalf1 that trademarks are source and origin identifiers, arguing instead that trademarks
today do not function as such. He considered this to be "[t]he orthodox definition"42 of the
function of trademarks. He bases his argument on the proposition that with the advance of the
movement of trade, it is neither practical, nor important for consumers to know the source
and origin of the goods and/or services. 43 This is because goods are usually manufactured far
from where they are consumed, and they reach consumers after being circulated amongst
manufacturers and traders. Thus, the idea that trademarks denote source and origin should be
discarded, because, from Schechter's point of view, "the source or origin of... goods bearing
a well-known trademark is seldom known to consumers."
44
He further contends that source and origin per se is of no particular importance. Instead,
the importance is the consumers' ability to know that the product reaches him/her "through
the same channels as certain other goods that have already given the consumer satisfaction,
origin/information basis of trade mark protection," and his ideas led many states in the U.S. to adopt anti-
dilution statutes.)
37 Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK
REP. 122, 126 (1993) ; see also Sabine Casparie-Kerdel, Dilution Disguised- Has the Concept of Dilution Made
its Way into the Laws of Europe, 23(4) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 185, 185 (2001). Some scholars argue that the
roots of dilution are found in the ruling of the Supreme Court of 1894 in Germany in the Odol case, where the
court expanded trademark protection of trademarks to include non-competing goods. but the court also required
the existence of likelihood of confusion; see TONY MARTINO, TRADEMARK DILUTION 4 (1st ed., Clarendon
Press, 1996). Schechter himself referred to this case in advocating his notion of quality (dilution); see Schechter,
supra note 10, at 345-346.
38 The term -dilution" seems to be an English translation for the German word "verw~issert" which was first
used by the German court in the Odol case; see Schechter. supra note 10, at 346.
39 Akazaki argues that utilitarian theorists use Schechter's rational regarding the quality function of trademarks;
they provide that since trademarks reduce consumer search costs then this will encourage then to produce high
quality products; see Lee Akazaki. Source Theory and Guarantee Theory in Anglo-American Trade Mark
Policy: A Critical Legal Study, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SoC'Y 255, 259 (1990).
40 Wil, supra note 23, at 14; see also Werner Ullah & Tony R. Martino, The Quality Guarantee Function of
Trade Marks: An Economic Viewpoint, 11(8) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 267, 268-269 (1989) (Ullah and
Martino argue that the quality argument is the basis for the utilitarian and economic justification of trademarks,
they argue that "trade marks lower consumer search costs[, and t]hey also act as an incentive to firms to develop
and maintain consistent quality.")
41 The Supreme Court argued that "[t]he primary and proper function of a trademark is to identify the origin or
ownership of the article to which it is affixed[, and w]here a party has been in the habit of labeling his goods
with a distinctive mark, so that purchasers recognize goods thus marked as being of his production, others are
debarred from applying the same mark to goods of the same description, because to do so ... may induce
purchasers to believe that the goods which he is selling are the manufacture of another person."; see Hanover
Star Milling v. Metcalf 240 U.S. 403, 412-413 (1916).
42 Schechter, supra note 10, at 334.
43 "[T]he growth of national and international markets destroyed th[e] intimacy between producer and
consumer", as such trademarks became quality identifiers "because they denote consistent quality", rather than
being origin and source identifiers; see D. M. HIGGINS & T. J. JAMES, THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF TRADE
MARKS IN THE UK (1973-1992) A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (The Intellectual Property Institute 5 (1996).
44 Schechter, supra note 10, at 335.
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and that bore the same trademark. ... [Thus t]he true functions of the trademark are... to
identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming
public. 45 The quality function of trademarks is based on the premise that if the public
recognizes the trademark as an indicator of origin, rather than as a quality identifier, then
there will be no rationale in choosing a certain brand, over another. In particular, when
consumers are interested in the utility of certain products, then "the trade mark serves to
remind the consumer that those articles have in the past satisfactorily carried out their
46intended or expected purposes".
As Schechter argues, a major insufficiency and inadequacy that results from considering
trademarks as source and origin identifiers is that the protection of trademarks shall not find a
proper justification if the mark is to be used by others for non-competing goods and/or
services, as long as no likelihood of consumer confusion exists. This kind of protection is
vital for the owner of a mark which has provided goods of consistent quality for a long time,
because he/she might decide to expand the scope of his/her business to include different
classes of goods and/or services. Further, allowing others to use a trademark for non-
competing goods and/or services will unfairly deprive trademark owners of the use of their
marks in which they have invested. He supports this argument by emphasising that the origin
and source function "ignores the fact that the creation and retention of custom ... is the
primary purpose of trademarks today." Further, he argues that the role of trademark
protection should be the focus on the "preservation of the uniqueness", 47 because using a
trademark on non-competing goods and/or services decreases the distinctiveness of the mark.
The real injury, which is now widely considered the definition of dilution, in such a case is:
[T]he gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public
mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods. The more distinctive
or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the
greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular
product in connection with which it has been used.48
However, although the individualistic nature of Schechter's argument is clear, some
courts and scholars have expanded the scope of his argument. The aim was to introduce
more monopolistic rights to trademark owners.
III. Schechter's Quality Argument and Further Expansion of the Owners' Rights
Schechter's argument, albeit unconvincing, is relatively straightforward. It aims to
provide a wide scope of protection to distinctive marks over non-competing goods and/or
services, on the basis that such marks are identifiers of quality. However, as Schechter's
concept does not define its scope, as some have argued,49 this matter has been subject to
discussions amongst both scholars and courts. Some have argued that "[i]t is not entirely
clear whether Schechter intended dilution theory to apply to noncompetitive situations only or
to the use of certain marks on related and unrelated goods."50 Such arguments have led to the
dilution concept expanding well beyond that of Schechter's intentions.
41 Id at 336.337.
46 Akazaki, supra note 39, at 258.
47 Schechter, supra note 10, at 339,340.48 Id at 342.
49 MARTINO, supra note 37, at 17.50 Id at 26.
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Some have argued that the scope of dilution should not only cover the use of famous
marks over dissimilar goods and/or services, but also the use of the mark over similar goods
and/or services. It could be questioned why dilution should protect famous marks when used
for similar goods, because marks are already protected under the traditional origin/confusion
rationale. The answer is that proponents of this expansive interpretation aim to simplify their
owner's burden of proof, and exempt him/her from proving any likelihood of confusion.
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove that such use is likely to dilute the distinctiveness of the
mark, without needing to prove actual damage.
This approach manifested in the European Court of Justice's decision in Davidoff v.
Gofkid.5 1 In this case, the defendant registered the trademark "Durffee" as being similar to the
plaintiffs well-known "Davidoff' trademark, and it was written in a very similar way, and
registered for the same class of goods for which the plaintiff was using his mark. Davidoff
filed a request to the German Patent and Trade Mark Office objecting to this registration, but
did not succeed. The case in the courts of first instance and appeal were equally
52unsuccessful. Thus, the plaintiff filed the case to the Bundesgerichtshof court, and the court
stayed the proceeding. In doing so, the court requested a ruling from the ECJ as to whether
Member States, according to the Directive,53 are entitled "to provide more extensive
protection for well-known marks in cases where the later mark is used or to be used for goods
or services identical with or similar to those in respect of which the earlier mark was
registered. 54 The hurdle which the court was dealing with was whether article 5(2) of the
Trademarks Directive, which protects well-known marks when used by others for dissimilar
goods and/or services, should be interpreted widely to cover the use of the mark on similar
goods and/or services. The protection of this latter case was the subject of article 5(1)(b) of
the Directive. This protects similar or identical marks from being used by others for similar or
identical goods and/or services, but requiring the existence of likelihood of confusion.
The ECJ refused the observations submitted to it by the Portuguese and U.K.
governments defending a narrow interpretation to article 5(2). The two governments argued
that the Davidoff case was already covered by article 5(1)(b) which requires the existence of
likelihood of confusion, and especially, that "a likelihood of confusion is found more readily
in the case of well-known marks. 55 The court finally ordered in favor of a wide
interpretation of article 5(2) to include the case of using well-known marks even for similar
goods and/or services, regardless of the existence of likelihood of confusion. In doing so, the
court interpreted this article as:
[E]ntitling the Member State to provide specific protection for well-known registered
trade marks in cases where a later mark or sign, which is identical with or similar to
the registered mark, is intended to be used or is used for goods or services identical
with or similar to those covered by the registered mark.56
51 Case C-292/00 Davidoff& Cie SA & Zino DavidoffSA v. Golkid Ltd, 2003 E.T.M.R. 42.52 Id. at 535.
53 Council Directive 89/104, 1988 (EC).
54 Davidoff& Cie SA & Zino DavidoffSA, E.T.M.R. 42 at 536.55 Id at 541.
56 Id at 543.
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Such an interpretation is wrongly based on the view held by its proponents that "[d]ilution
is not simply a broadening of the protection originally given to trade marks. It is an entirely
separate concept, with its own conditions and restrictions. 57
Contrary to this approach, Schechter's merit is that his concept was clear with a well
defined scope, although one may disagree with his argument. He limited the scope of those
marks that were eligible for protection under his concept. He argued that "arbitrary, coined or
fanciful marks or names should be given [a] much broader degree of protection than symbols,
words or phrases in common use," 58 and he restricted his argument to use for non-competing
goods and/or services. 59 However, it could be clearly inferred that Schechter's argument
focuses on trademark owners, thereby raising questions as to whether trademark protection
should seek to protect the quality of marks, or otherwise should provide equality amongst the
owners and the consuming public.
IV. Quality or Equality?
It is imperative to analyze Schechter's argument regarding quality, in order to
comprehend what is the real and proper rational basis of trademark protection. Thus, one
should question the validity of this argument, and assess whether the origin/source argument
still maintains its merits, or whether it is simply an outdated traditional argument, as
Schechter maintains.
The basis of the quality argument, by which the distinctiveness and the association of the
trademark affixed with the product arises because of the owners' efforts, is not accurate. On
the contrary, the consuming public fulfils the essential role in establishing this association
between the mark and the article. While an owner might try to build the association and
invest in doing so, he/she might fail because the recognition of consumers in associating the
mark with their product concludes the association. As such, the party that deserves protection
and reward for this association is the public at large. 60 This is because the consuming public
is the party who attribute the mark to the article, and thus, they have the right to maintain this
association, withdraw it or lessen its significance. The owner is by no means entitled to claim
this right as his/her own.
Although one might find a wide agreement and consensus among the public that certain
products have high quality, the assessment of quality remains a relative matter that differs
from one case to the other and is subjective rather than objective in nature. What one person
57 Casparie-Kerdel, supra note 37, at 194; see also Stephanie Chong, Protection of Famous Trademarks Against
Use for Unrelated Goods and Services: A Comparative Analysis of the Law in the United States, the United
Kingdom and Canada and Recommendations for the Canadian Law Reform, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 642, 643
(2005).
58 Schechter, supra note 10, at 343. Arbitrary mark "refers to a word in common use that has no meaning related
to the product that it is used to name," such as APPLE for computers. whereas a fanciful mark is "the made-up
name that resembles no other word, such as EXXON or KODAK."; see William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, The Economics of Trademark La. 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267, 288 (1988); see also Chris Brown, A
Dilution Delusion: The Unjustifiable Protection of Similar Marks, 72 U of CINCINNATI L. REV. 1023, 1027
(2003-2004).
59 Schechter, supra note 10, at 341-345; see also Pier L. Roncaglia, Should We Use Guns and Missiles to Protect
Famous Trademarks in Europe?, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 559 (1998).
60 Wilf argues that Schechter credits trademarks owners for their rationality and presumes that consumers are
irrational. Wilf stresses the opposite, arguing that "[p]urchasers carefully choose material goods to construct an
outward expression of identity", and this is exactly what Schechter's argument fails to acknowledge; see Wilf,
supra note 23, at 15.
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considers to be of high quality, others may find otherwise. Quality differs according to needs
and expectations which is assessed on individual basis, thus "[t]he assumption that a trade
marked product must be of high quality because it bears a trade mark, is unfounded".6'
Moreover, the quality notion "is in principle a neutral term which can mean good or bad
quality associated with a certain source of the product", 62 because when "a consumer learns
that he does not want particular goods, the mark ... becomes a significant warning signal. 63
This suggests that the matter of quality, whether positive or negative, is something
appurtenant to the source and origin function. Indeed,
[t]rade mark law makes nowhere a value judgment: trade marks and their protection
are available to high and low quality products alike. The indicative function of the
trade mark can therefore work either way -it can identify products as being goods of
high quality, but it can also warn customers to avoid certain product in the future.
64
The quality function argument wrongly relies upon the idea that quality function is the
only function of trademarks. 65 Schechter pays little heed to the source and origin function,
even as a primary function. Rather, he considers the quality function as being the true
function, implying that any other function, source and origin, is untrue. He considers that "the
preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its
protection".66 This "only rational basis" leads to strange, indeed unnatural conclusions, and
accordingly, trademarks bearing products of negative or bad quality should not receive
protection. Moreover, trademarks with neutral quality do not merit protection because they do
not resemble quality in the sense that Schechter argues. In contrast to this approach, the
quality of products does not determine the protection. Therefore, a trademark receives
protection regardless of the merits of the affixed goods and/or services.
The focus should be assessing the core of Schechter's argument: that the protection of
trademarks should extend to including any situation where the mark is used for dissimilar
goods. Discussing this issue leads to the importance of the philosophical foundations of
trademarks, where trademark systems should be driven to achieve the vital goal of ensuring
justice amongst the involved parties. As such, Schechter's argument seeks to provide as much
protection as possible for the owners in terms of expense and the rights of both the public and
other traders.
V. Proposed Rationale for Trademarks Systems Based on the Source and Origin
Function
The insufficiency in Schechter's argument does not mean that owners of trademarks
should enjoy no protection whatsoever. Nor does it mean that owners of well-known
trademarks should not enjoy more protection than owners of ordinary marks. Rather, any
trademark system should aim to provide protection for trademark owners, and, at the same
61 Andreas Rahmatian, Trade Mark Infringement as a Criminal Offence, 67(4) MOD L. REV. 670, 680 (2004).
62 Id
63 CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 17, at 621; see also the ruling of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
the U.S., arguing that the trader's "mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it
carries his name for good or ill."; see Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
64 Rahmatian, supra note 61, 680.65 Ullah & Martino, supra note 40, at 267 (arguing that advocates of the quality function "have made an
exaggerated attempt to escape the strict doctrinal requirement of a known source.")
66 Schechter, supra note 10, at 345 (emphasis added).
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time, protect the rights of the consuming public and other traders. 67 Adhering to the argument
that the source and origin function of trademarks are the only primary function achieves this
because there are secondary functions, which might (but not necessarily) include the quality,
advertising and information functions.
According to the source and origin function, owners of ordinary marks should enjoy their
rights over their trademarks where they can use their marks and prevent others from using an
identical mark over the same class of goods and/or services to which the original mark is
affixed. This is because consumer confusion (as to the source or origin) is the main criterion
according to the origin and source function, and in using identical marks over the same class
of goods and/or services the confusion amongst consumers is assumed,68 and the owner shall
not be obliged to prove it. In this case the owner shall enjoy the right to ensure that his/her
mark is not used by others who could unfairly take advantage by using an identical mark over
the same class of goods and/or services, and the consuming public is protected from being
confused. One the one hand, if someone uses an identical or similar mark for an identical or
similar class of goods and/or services, then the owner of the mark shall have the right to
prevent such use if he/she could prove that the public will be confused by this use, or at least,
that the public will likely be confused by such use.
69
Owners of well-known trademarks shall enjoy more protection than owners of ordinary
trademarks. Some marks prove to have more distinctiveness, repute or fame than others, and
this is achieved through the owners' investment and, more importantly, the high degree of
recognition and association which the consuming public attributes to the mark with the class
of goods and/services to which they are used. Such marks deserve more protection than
ordinary marks; however, the questions are important: what kind of protection should such
marks deserve? How could this protection preserve the owners' rights, other traders' rights
and public interest?
Schechter dealt with these questions from one perspective, namely the trademark owners'
rights. Due to his adherence to the quality function, he wrongly concludes that trademarks
should receive full protection when used by others for non-related goods, 70 because
Schechter's policy focuses on "offer[ing] enhanced protection to originators of unique
marks. 71 However, the proper and real injury is to provide protection to the trademark owner
and deprive other traders and the public of their rights. Thus, well-known marks should enjoy
protection as long as their use by others results in confusion, or the likelihood of confusion as
to the source or origin. One scholar has argued, in defence of such approach, that expanding
the protection of trademarks to cover dissimilar goods and/or services should "cover cases in
which the strength of the earlier mark's reputation was such that confusion would occur
despite the lack of similarity of the parties' goods, as long as confusion" exists. 72 This way,
owners of well-known trademarks enjoy more protection than owners of ordinary marks
because of their investment in the mark, and other traders shall have the right to use the mark
on other classes of goods and/or services as long as there is no confusion, or likelihood of
67 Chad J. Doellinger, A New Theory of Trademarks, 111 PENN. ST L. REV. 823, 833 (2007); see also Denicola,
supra note 16, at 80.
68 See, e.g., Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 10(1) (U.K.), where the existence of likelihood of confusion is not
required.69 Id at § 10(2).
70 Schechter, supra note 10, at 339,345.
71 MARTINO, supra note 37, at 23.
72 Amanda Michaels, Confusion in and about Sections 5(3) and 10(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994, 22(7) EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 335, 339 (2000).
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confusion. More importantly, the public will have the prerogative of using the mark where
they have participated in its formulation, and they will enjoy the right to enjoy cultural and
expressive rights with regard to the mark. This cultural use of trademarks is, indeed, vital to
us as a public, because "our culture is enriched by these trade marks. They tell us a story and
they entertain us. They help us to express ourselves in relation to our world. 7 3
This rationale seeks equity and equality amongst the parties involved in trademarks,
rather than adopting a quality argument, which serves to create illegitimate barriers of
competition and affects the social and cultural development of the society in question. Once
again, the importance of revisiting the philosophical foundation of trademarks comes to the
surface in order to be able to legitimize and justify protection based on the confusion-
origin/source rationale.
However, Schechter's proponents and advocates of the dilution doctrine argue that
Schechter's argument suffers from inadequacy, because it fails to answer some "fundamental
questions concerning the scope and the application of the doctrine".74 Thus, courts and
scholars tried to interpret the dilution rational and this resulted in further expansion in the
owner's rights.
Conclusion
The source and origin function of trademarks remains a valid, and indeed solid argument,
and forms the proper function of trademarks. It enables owners of well-known trademarks to
enjoy more protection than owners of ordinary ones. This function also preserves the rights of
other traders, as well as the rights of the public. On the other hand, a number of inadequacies
and hurdles in the quality argument prevent its application to trademarks. Indeed, "[i]t is
unclear ... whether today Schechter would have divined the same need for promoting [such]
a doctrine., 75 Thus, by adopting the source and origin function as the only primary function
of trademarks, we might return to a more appropriate and rational basis for trademark
protection.
73 Megan Richardson, Copyright in Trade Marks? On Understanding Trade Mark Dilution, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q.
66, 79 (2000).
74 MARTINO, supra note 37, at 17.
75 DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION FEDERAL, STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1 st ed., The
Bureau of National Affairs, 2002).
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